HERMAN VS. KANT: CONFLICT OF DUTIES IN ETHICAL THEORY

Abstract

B a c k g r o u n d . The article is devoted to the exploration of the concept of moral duty and the issue of the possibility of conflicting duties (moral dilemmas) in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, as well as to the analysis of the reinterpretation of this concept in the ethical theory of Barbara Herman.

M e t h o d s . The research was carried out on the basis of conceptual analysis and hermeneutic interpretation of primary sources, comparative method, as well as case-study method for the study of Kant's "Metaphysics of Morals" and Hermann's work "The Practice of Moral Judgment". The aim is to identify conceptual differences between between Kant's categorical imperative, which formulates universal and unconditional moral laws, and Herman's interpretation of duty, which takes into account the specific circumstances encountered by the moral agent in real-life contexts.

R e s u l t s . The findings of the study demonstrate that Herman's approach, while expanding the applicability of Kantian ethics to complex life situations, simultaneously generates new philosophical challenges. In particular, it raises the issue of maintaining the consistency and internal coherence of moral principles in cases where universal ethical norms are adapted to diverse contexts – thus outlining both the potential and the limitations of adapting Kant's deontological ethics to the practice of moral judgment.

C o n c l u s i o n s . The theory of duty, grounded in the categorical imperative, denies the very possibility of a genuine collision between moral obligations, since a universal moral law cannot give rise to contradictory demands. In contrast, Herman proposes a pragmatic approach aimed at reconciling strict moral principles with the realities of moral practice. She develops a broader interpretation of duty that incorporates the situational context of decision-making and acknowledges the significance of concrete circumstances for moral choice.