MODERN INTERPRETATION OF THE ORDINARY LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY: A CONTEXTUALIST APPROACH

Abstract

B a c k g r o u n d . In current debates about knowledge, the contextualist approach – especially its reliance on how people use the word "know" in everyday conversations – has faced growing criticism. The core issue is this: just because something is commonly said doesn't mean it should be taken as a solid basis for building a theory. Everyday ways of speaking may reflect certain habits or intuitions, but they don't automatically justify splitting knowledge into different types – like "low-standard knowledge" (L-knowledge) and "high-standard knowledge" (H-knowledge). In short, the contextualist argument, which claims that what counts as knowledge depends on the situation, doesn't hold up. Its reliance on linguistic habits is too weak to support the weight of its theoretical conclusions.

M e t h o d s . This study uses conceptual analysis to clarify how different kinds of knowledge are understood – particularly the difference between low-, medium-, and high-standard knowledge. It also draws on historical and philosophical research, including a close look at major thinkers and recent theories.

R e s u l t s . One key finding is that high-standard knowledge (H-knowledge) – the kind that demands complete certainty – doesn't work in practice. It adds no real value to how we talk, reason, or act together. If only infallible knowledge counted, most everyday claims to "know" something would fall apart. Worse still, the kind of extreme doubt used to justify H-knowledge is destructive – it erases even ordinary, useful knowledge and breaks down our ability to think or act with any confidence.

In contrast, low-standard knowledge (L-knowledge), where certainty isn't required, proves both useful and defensible. This idea traces back to thinkers like N. Malcolm and fits well with how we actually reason and communicate. Keeping this fallible – but functional – idea of knowledge allows us to tell the difference between informed belief and mere guesswork. It also helps language and teamwork function effectively. So L-knowledge isn't a weaker form of knowing – it's a practical tool for dealing with uncertainty and making decisions.

C o n c l u s i o n s . The paper argues that H-knowledge and L-knowledge can't be combined into a single theory. They come from fundamentally different ways of thinking about what it means to "know". There's no middle ground here: a choice must be made. And the better choice, as argued, is fallibilism – the view that knowledge can still be valid even if it isn't perfect. Radical doubt still plays an important role in philosophy, but it shouldn't push us to demand impossible standards. Instead, it should remind us why more flexible, realistic standards work better. In the end, the fallibilist approach doesn't represent a compromise – it's the only workable foundation for a consistent and useful theory of knowledge.