CONCEPTS OF AUTHENTICITY OF HAPPINESS: OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE APPROACHES TO VALUES

Abstract

B a c k g r o u n d . In contemporary moral philosophy, the authenticity problem assumes greater and greater importance, particularly due to discussions about the nature of happiness and the good life. Alongside the classical Aristotelian tradition of eudaimonia, the subjective concepts of well-being have emerged that emphasize the experiences of the individual, as well as objectivistic theories that link happiness to universal values. Existentialists (Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre) developed the idea that life can be inauthentic even in conditions of subjective satisfaction, which raises the question of the status of authenticity as a boon. The purpose of this article is to explore the relationship between authenticity and happiness and to determine whether authenticity can be considered an independent good.

M e t h o d s . The following methods were applied: a comparative analysis of the main approaches to understanding happiness and authenticity; a historical and philosophical reconstruction of the concept of authenticity from Rousseau to modern authors (Taylor, Kekes, Haybron, Nussbaum); phenomenological analysis of existentialist concepts of "being-in-the-world" and "mauvaise foi".

R e s u l t s . Two key models of understanding authenticity were identified, namely: the discovery of the original state (Rousseau) and the acquisition or self-projection (Sartre, Heidegger). In objectivist concepts of happiness, authenticity is a condition when life goals conform with value criteria, while in subjectivist concepts, it is problematized through the social conditioning of desires. Hybrid models (Kekes, Taylor, Haybron) attempt to merge these approaches by combining the rational mediation of desires with the need to "live by one's own voice." It was reasoned that authenticity is not automatically a boon: its achievement can both contribute to and conflict with the subjective feeling of happiness.

C o n c l u s i o n s . Authenticity plays a vital role in the autonomous development of a value system, but its status as a boon is contingent and depends on how well it aligns with an individual's structure of welfare. Further research should focus on developing criteria that allow authenticity to be integrated into contemporary theories of happiness without reducing it to subjective experiences or objective lists of values.