• Anna Laktionova Doctor of science (Philosophy), associate professor, full professor of the department of Theoretical and Practical Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv (Ukraine)



Truth, Realism, Relativism, Paul Boghossian, Crispin Wright, JC Beall


In the contemporary English-language philosophy the problems of truth, realism, and relativism appear actual and interconnected; this evidences reciprocal complementarity and definability between metaphysics, epistemology and methodologies of philosophical investigations. In the article relevant views of prominent today philosophers – Paul Boghossian, Crispin Wright, JC Beall – are comparatively analyzed.

In the considered articles the ordinary view on dispute of inclinations is analyzed in competition with other possible interpretations. For example, one person likes stewed rhubarb, another – doesn’t. This is a case of true disagreement: each person maintains the position that another denies.

Such disagreement Wright calls the dispute of inclinations; ordinary view on dispute of inclinations involves: really incompatible attitudes (contradiction), the faultlessness of each side, rational maintaining of the view in spite of obvious unresolved disagreement (sustainability).

According to Boghossian the attitude of relativism involves tree components: metaphysical – denying of “absolute” facts of a certain type (from some specific investigative domain) in favor of relative; recommendational – permission to accept only appropriate relative propositions; limiting – about meanings which allow unexpected parameters that relativize.

Beall advocates “Polarity View” and fruitfully applies it to analyze the ordinary view. Modeling of the former involves: concepts of truthmakers, positive and negative polarity, atomic facts, situational semantics. The formal modeling and philosophical explanation coincide.

Each of the authors defends realism and correspondence understanding of truth (in particular truth as relation of proposition’s correspondence to a fact); and also opposes relativism. At the same time, relativism turns out to be an inevitable (at least implicitly inherent to all three authors) tendency, which testifies to at least the contextual (Boghossian) relativity of non-cognitive concepts or competencies (Wright); functional fixation of facts in their application (Beall).


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How to Cite

Laktionova, A. (2021). TRUTH, REALISM, RELATIVISM: INTERCONNECTION AND RECIPROCAL DEFINABILITY. Bulletin of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. Philosophy, 2(5), 29-36.