DIGITAL IDENTITY AS A NEW FORM OF SUBJECT IN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY

Abstract

B a c k g r o u n d . In the 21st century, digital technologies are not only radically changing the world, but also transforming the very nature of human subjectivity. The focus of attention of modern American philosophy is the phenomenon of the "digital personality" – a new form of "I", which is not reducible to the autonomous, rational subject of classical philosophy, which was initiated by Rene Descartes in the 17th century. The article is devoted to the analysis of changes in the understanding of the subject under the influence of digital technologies, in particular in the works of such modern thinkers as Sherry Turkle, Donna Garaway and Luciano Floridi.

M e t h o d s . The study used general scientific methods of analysis, synthesis, induction and deduction, as well as historical and philosophical approaches: comparative-historical analysis (to compare the views of philosophers of different times and countries), hermeneutics (to interpret philosophical texts), conceptual reconstruction (to analyze the concepts of the subject, body, digital "I").

R e s u l t s . The outstanding maxim of R. Descartes's "Cogito, ergo sum" becomes the starting point for the formation of the modern "I", but in the digital age it undergoes transformation. For example, in S. Turkle, the computer is no longer just a tool, it is a mirror of the mind that reflects and transforms identity and self-perception. Her concept of the "second self" and "life on the screen" describes how digital technologies change the process of socialization and thinking, especially among the younger generation. On the other hand, D. Garaway in the "Cyborg Manifesto" introduces

the metaphor of a hybrid subject, where the boundary between man and machine is blurred, and gender, body and technology become interconnected components. L. Floridi offers his informational approach to the personality, considering it as a structure in the infosphere, which is constantly updated, similar to hypertext. Such thinking denies the stability, integrity and autonomy of the subject.

C o n c l u s i o n s . The article concludes that digital subjectivity is not a continuation of the traditional idea of the "I", but rather its radical revision. The ideas of S. Turkle, D. Garaway and L. Floridi demonstrate that the modern subject is an open, dynamic, changeable, information-network agent. The digital "I" can no longer be understood without taking into account technology, social interaction and information flows. In this context, philosophy acquires particular relevance as a means of critical analysis of identity in the digital age. Accordingly, the philosophical understanding of subjectivity requires new approaches that take into account both the bodily and technical, both personal and social dimensions of human existence. An important task is also to rethink the categories of privacy, emotionality, freedom in a world where technology is not a background, but a structural element of the subject itself.